September, 7^th, 2004

Dear People’s Deputies,
Dear candidates to President of Ukraine,
Dear Prime minister, Members of the Government,
Dear representatives of the judicial branch of power,
Dear journalists,

Dear guests,

Ukraine has entered the decisive phase of its searches of its all-national name and image which will actually identify Ukraine throughout the next five years, at least.

For us, the coming presidential elections are not only and not so much about implementing the social demand for a new leader of the state via the democratic procedure; for Ukraine it is about a change of power, of political eons, about the transition to a new phase of the national history.

If one would take into account that Ukrainian politics is all too personified, that the President has all the hopes rested with, and all discontentment and reproves addressed to him then it becomes obviously clear that the whole thing is actually about opting for our future.

By significance for the country’s future this moment of truth could be compared to August-December 1991, and by socio-political tension, to the developments and processes of late 80ies – early 90ies of the century that recently faded.

Lest the socially distraught Ukrainian present-day would turn into another lost historical chance for the country, lest the heat of pre-election competition and clashes would burn out that axis around which our life is restored, lest we should have to order sermons and requiem services over lost perspectives -- the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine needs, and really must demonstrate an all-embracing responsibility.

Such its actions might be possible throughout the Sixth and all coming sessions only when it finally stretches out to fill in the whole contour of its constitutional destination, when everyone of us comes to a clear comprehension of the fact that the Verkhovna Rada by its all-national essence and constitutional directedness nowadays, like it has been never before, emerges in the state like that stable Ukrainian Capitol that has been destined in this historical time

to determine and keep steady on the democratic vector of the country development;

to keep and to strengthen it against those who would rather eye the tree of Ukrainian democracy as a barren trunk on which a decorative offshoot of the legislative branch of power only pretends to live;

to offset those who are inexplicably persevering in holding their Parliament up for derision inside Ukraine and beyond, obviously unwilling to realise it out that, by doing this, they make clowns of their own people;

to offset those who would rather prefer having the Verkhovna Rada to fall miserably on the sideway of the State building processes and mostly preoccupying themselves with disputes and with producing routine laws.

We are currently in that point of the power tie-break that opens beneficial opportunities for self-organisation, re-taking and strengthening positions proper for the Parliament. The Verkhovna Rada will be worth something no sooner than it has a position, namely a collective, consolidated, and responsible one – and when it will defend such its position.

For this to be achieved, it should be necessary to get rid of the artificially forced segregation of the people’s deputies because of which they find themselves forcefully ‘conscripted’ or “recruited” to opposite camps and for that reason are forced to participate in clash “rites”. For this to be achieved, it should be necessary to stop disguising the unscrupulousness under political professionalism, to step away from balancing private interests and to bet on the people, to cease being political ‘slave force’.

A civilized coexistence of factions and groups, the majority and the minority is required today like it has never been before. Here an understanding that the opposition – and, first of all, the left opposition -- not only testifies to the democratic image of Ukraine but also protects it from revolutionary outbursts is of critical importance. For given the divide of the Ukrainian society as per the host of factors and criteria, its ownership-based and spiritual (moral) stratification, there almost is no chance for us for keep it in a balanced and moderate way.

The opposition should not be ‘squeezed’ out of the public life also because it should remain in sight of the citizens and under their supervision. Which means for it to be a responsible opposition.

In the final count, it is about us having to decisively refute this shameful forced practice of dividing the nation into ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ by splitting the Parliament into enemy camps. One should refute it with one’s personal open position and practical steps so that the lines from the Oath of Deputy on self-negating service to Ukraine and its people would not remain an empty proclamation but would rather become a catechesis of our dignity, honour and consciousness.

If we fail to do that in this most opportune time, there will be same total wars of nerves, bleeding showdowns and cockfights, same debasement of the whole institute of parliamentarism in the Session Hall and beyond it.

And this would continue irrespective of who becomes the President, for he or she would follow the ill-known tradition trying to submit the Verkhovna Rada, to rank the lawmakers and to make them fit his scale. And then we will mostly only talk of democracy.

Dear colleagues,

The said above might and, to my mind, ought to be qualified in its totality as the first and foremost particularity of this session.

Its second particularity is that the moment of choice sharpens the social demand for truth, the truth about Ukraine’s today and tomorrow. For the responsible truth that may not be reduced to seeking those guilty or to tying all the issues exclusively with activities of the current President or Government.

Because the majority of us, in this or that way, by this or that measure are or have been in certain periods participating in making many state decisions and practically implementing them.

And then, taking the courage to say that grave truth, we, first of all, must do it in a way public and unbiased.

We must clearly, rather that from electoral-competitive standpoint, see chances, challenges, risks and threats Ukraine is facing now.

The principal task is to prevent seasonal total sale of Ukraine, a controlled isolation of Ukraine, and consequently, an outburst of uncontrolled emotions.

It should be particularly stressed on because the majority of potential threats to the national security, specifically those determined by us in the Law “On the Fundamentals of the National Security of Ukraine”, make their way from the list of potential into that of real ones. This happens also because the national security as such in the heat of pre-election fight is pushed to background or swapped with the struggle for leadership.

What is meant here, one might ask?

In the area of internal policy it is about violations of the Constitution and the law of Ukraine, of the human and citizenship rights and freedoms by bodies of central and local self-government; about insufficient surveillance over the enforcement of requirements of the Constitution and the law of Ukraine; about  threats of separatist manifestations and of a divide of the nation; about structural and functional imbalance of the political framework of the society, about inaptness of certain its units to a timely reaction on threats to the national security, and further deepening of the gap between the power and the society, between the power and the public.

All this makes the Ukrainian democracy a shaky and exceedingly susceptible one.

Threats in the social and moral-spiritual area concern the fact that Ukraine, in trying to survive, leaves the weak ones to die when only those who can become guardians of their own souls may surface the life, and when criminal privatization and all-embracing corruption have successfully killed the belief in the just labour as a source not only of the survival, but also of a richer life.

Gambling with patriotism would also fit in here.

Pavlo Zagrebelnyi sees those threats all too well; he painfully admits, ‘the nation dies away, and its language, its footprint on the Earth dies with it. No highest level of economic progress, machinery or consumer gadgets would spare from that... For there can be no riches, no power to compensate for the decay of the nation’s soul’.

One extremely serious challenge to the national security is a progressive deconsolidation of the Ukrainian society.

Issues of national security have been reduced in the economic area to discussions of whether the thesis of the Ukrainian ‘economic marvel’ is real or preconceived. We instead say practically nothing of the critical situation with fixed production assets in leading industrial sectors, agroindustrial complex and life support systems.

None the least threats hides the budgetary policy, starting with forecasts and planning, and ending with all those “cushions” and shadow gameplay.

The country needs a transparent budgetary policy. The country needs a budget of growth, not of survival. A budget it should be that would correlate with at least minimum social needs. The budget with the starting figure for the year 2005 of at least 100 billion. It is a pleasure to note that the Prime Minister of Ukraine leaves no his efforts to bring that position into life, still more that cooperation between the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers, the one that is necessary to be strengthened and increased, provides possibilities of making agreed budget decisions.

It is important in principle to see that it should not be a hostage of the presidential campaign.

Let us live to the laws, to that Budgetary Code at least, without waiting for directives a new President would channel to us.

To act to that logic would mean to stop all the life in Ukraine for two or three months and to continue absolutising the presidential mandate.

The issue of peculiarities of the economic integration of Ukraine and the related risks for the national security requires the most serious and qualified discussion.

While regarding the economic integration and it is true of  the Russian direction of it, as the imperative of time, we have to clearly define it from the political and legislative points of view: what level of foreign capital and foreign owners’ penetration into the nation’s economy is acceptable in national security terms? Where does the margin lie beyond which the economic integration switches into political domination over us bringing with it liquidation or merger of a sovereign state?

None the less important is to distinguish between objective needs of deeper international cooperation and interaction and the strife of some politicians to independently alter internal and external policy vectors making their own country, as some would put it, face to face with the already existing facts.

In the foreign policy, in general, critical importance is attributed to the prevention of further indifference to Ukraine, or isolation or international oblivion strategy  implementation.

It is widely known that Ukraine remains the testing ground for trial run of the political regime democratization technology. And that the campaign of democratic pressing on Ukraine may not only affect the breakdown of political forces inside the country, but also make the process of further democratization and of efficient government power system formation more complicated.

While appreciating “an outsider’s advice”, we still have to come from the position that it is in our national interests to demonstrate an ability and pursuit to guarantee free, transparent and fair Presidential elections. Thus, we should demonstrate our commitment to see Ukraine in the family of European nations, and this striving has to become the cornerstone of our national existence.

We also cannot avoid a political and legislative response to the question on Ukraine’s place in the fight against international terrorism. Any attempt to either get used to it or isolate oneself from it and wait in a safe hide would be equally dangerous and short-sighted.

It is necessary to speak, specifically and particularly, about Ukrainian judicial system and practices as an threat of scale and a challenge to the national security of Ukraine.

Dear People’s Deputies and guests of the Verkhovna Rada,

The third peculiarity of the current session is immediately defined by the place and the role of the Verkhovna Rada in the Presidential election campaign.

The objective of the Verkhovna Rada is to promote, to the maximum possible extent, the nation’s stability in this transitional period; to prevent the least vacuum in the state power or decisions and actions taken to the principle “after us the deluge”; to cut any uncontrolled passions within the society; to direct and restrain the election competition in a democratic way; also to simultaneously increase its activity level and to efficiently perform its legislative, constitutive and controlling responsibilities.

Having already passed the point of no-return in the pre-election campaign, we have all the grounds to speak of the results and of those lessons that should be learned on the second phase of this campaign.

I would like to further dwell on those generalizations and appraisals that, I may view, are of fundamental importance.

First and foremost, the hopes for democratic elections still remain not responded, particularly taking into account that democratic procedures become more complicated in line with Ukrainian society development within a new framework.

Secondly, the campaign is in many respects artificially brought to, one might say, a confrontation between the power and the people, when the choice can be made from among only two of its representatives. Other candidates are no less artificially squeezed outside the election field. The choice opportunities are made narrower, and this can be considered as an exquisite psychological form of exerting pressure upon the electorate. Generally, the present practice of racing for the presidency shows the evidence that winners do intend to follow the downtrodden way, including in relation to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Thirdly, by their political and intellectual richness, the election competitions have not reached the level of all-Ukrainian discussion — as it was expected to be — and in many cases they are forcefully eroded to the squaring of accounts between candidates and reactions to mutual attacks.

In these circumstances, their positions quite often modify only in color shades but not in the crux and the depth of the problems bound to be resolved.

The conclusion suggests itself: the teams of the candidates play off the candidates per se and dictate them the tactics of behaviour, while some of the teams impose technologies of “taking society as a flock” and of the black PR.

Fourthly, this is an increased threat of the drag and divide inside the nation. Hence, there is a threat that the winner will not have national support.

Fifthly, this is interference, both open and concealed, of different power representatives into the election process. An ostensible showing of the disposition to this or that candidate, which is in most cases limited by this very showing, undermines the authority of not so much popular Ukrainian power, and makes the State less attractive in the eyes of international community.

I say nothing about the fact that it hurts the candidates for the presidency, and hurts very much. But one should be so estranged from real life to live in the persuasion that authority influences social mood!

However, it is possible to persuade somebody for some time using force or, rather, to restrain someone’s feelings by force, but it is hard and almost impossible to keep people in such persuasion and restraint.

Sixthly, there is insolent neglecting of the constitutional provisions regarding equal rights and opportunities for candidates to have access to electronic mass media, which can be observed now in the sphere both of public and private, national and local TV and broadcasting.

Even having progressive basic legislation, even under the condition of the developing of so important political process that is the nation-wide election campaign, even having an opportunity of unlimited and transparent control for the informational actions of managers, owners or simply censors – division of information bearers into the worst enemies and friendly and righteous speakers has become false and corner-stone axiom not only for local TV and radio companies but also for national TV channels.

It is rather simple to understand what guides the television and radio managers. However, it is unclear what this excessive motivation is that guides the actions of their crisis managers. After all, at all times and in all eras, any informational blockade or informational killer activity has raised at an unattainable height the halo of a martyr of that leader who was refused in the right to communicate with the people. Exactly such a figure would receive the support and sympathy from millions of people who by nature were inclined to contribution and sometimes to self-sacrifice for the sake of justice.

And finally, seventh: holding in high respect  all the candidates to the post of the head of State, I should say that such their number of 26 is the result of the simplified understanding of the role and place of the institute of the presidency in Ukraine.

Also there is the subject for thinking of the improvement of the election legislation.

It is clear that the Central Election Commission, territorial and divisional election commissions are the national body for organization and conducting of the elections of the President of Ukraine. But under present circumstances, the Verkhovna Rada should undertake today the following measures:

- perform monitoring on implementation issues of legislation dealing with elections of the President of Ukraine, having created an ad hoc parliamentary commission for this purpose ;

- come out with an address to the state power bodies, self-government bodies, enterprises, institutions, establishments and organizations, their leaders, other public officers and officials as well as to the journalists, leaders of mass media, public associations and organizations;

- act as a guarantor of the legislative and political security for all members of election committees – from the Central Election Commission to local election commissions that will act in accordance with the spirit and the form of the law.

We have to do our best to prevent legitimate mechanisms of power change from trampling down; since such trampling will pave the way to the upheaval.

We have to prevent a victory through of manipulations and force because it will turn into the disgrace for the entire country.

We have to do all the best to prevent “no-choice” elections. Even in short and stormy newest history of Ukraine, our citizens had opportunity for making choice both in 1991, in 1994 and also in 1999.

The President of Ukraine shall be the person who is elected by the people.

In his speech on the occasion of the 13-th anniversary of the Ukrainian statehood, Mr. L.D. Kuchma declared firmly and unambiguously: “Everything will be in such a way as the Ukrainian people will decide”.

Thus, we have all the grounds to believe in this course of events.

Dear colleagues,

A specific fourth determinant of the particularities of this session will be left by the problem of the political reform.

In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to some points that have not yet been the subject of a parliamentary discussion, and probably of a discussion in general. Respectively, they can be considered as new elements of this important topic, the necessity of bringing of which to the logical completion have been supported by all the major political players.

First of all, this is a definition of the political structure formed in Ukraine, and the underlying reasons for this structure formation.

From the early 1990-ies Ukrainian realities can be compared to the democratization processes in the countries of Latin America, where the President was given an extremely wide mandate. This practice is determined as a delegated democracy.

Then, as you remember, we had a splash of democratic changes. Still, soon it began to decline rapidly. Having faced deep crisis processes in the economy and an increased social dissatisfaction of people, political institutions and representative power sharply slowed down in development. Moreover, they started to delegate a part of their responsibility to the President having agreed, therefore, that this is he who should be the main support of the nation. This was enshrined in the Constitutional Agreement and with time – in the Constitution of 1996. Instead, the Verkhovna Rada began progressively to less perform its duty of peoples’ representation. Therefore, the formation of party system and political pluralism was suspended.

Nevertheless, there was one positive thing that the President has accumulated in his hands the necessary key factors for short-term and medium-term reforms. Simultaneously he has isolated himself from the public pressure, having canalized it to the Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers where he used to be at the head.

Of course, one can debate whether this has brought any benefits to the country. But the fact is that finally hyperinflation was overcome and gradual economic recovery was ensured.

At the same time, such a system began to breakdown rapidly and to show its problem spots.

I would mention only some of them:

- it is necessary for the structural reforms to have a widespread support, interconnected responsibility of legislative and executive authority. It is hard to do it under the old system because almost everything is under control of the head of state;

- the Verkhovna Rada is unable to continuously perform the functions of a driving belt, running errands for the President, and, therefore, it is starting losing  loyalty to the President since it feels the public pressure under the conditions of limited opportunities;

- democratic consolidation of the society cannot be provided without a responsible acting party system and civil institutes. Moreover, under acting political system the law on elections on the proportional basis will not work in practice, while the lack of independent ideological positions continues to be felt all more visually;

- absence of public control becomes more and more felt, especially taking into account that the President has decisive influence on manpower policy and possesses direct control over the enforcement agencies;

- insufficient control over local bodies and lack of initiative on the side of local bodies increase.

If we accept the proposed logic for substantiation of changes to the Constitution of Ukraine then we will certainly find a coordinated decision.

I want to emphasize: a coordinated decision.

The issue will be only when and how it can be done.

And in order to achieve this we need not the ritual conjurations but we need to facilitate consultations, develop compromises, and outwork agreed positions.

The attempts to break the Verkhovna Rada to pieces, to stimulate or blackmail the people’s deputies can turn into a confrontation and a public upheaval. It cannot be allowed.

Dear People’s Deputies,

Those who occupy high positions and who are in full view by all, this is true of the Parliament as well, should not allow abrupt movements for themselves. Nowadays, these words should be emphatically addressed to all who are involved in formation of the political climate in Ukraine today and in political weather forecasts for tomorrow.

We all should jointly approximate the time when discretion, moderateness and responsibility will finally prevail over passing aspirations and prides, emotionally biased efforts, attempts to outcry each other, subjective sympathies and antipathies. We should altogether work on introducing these positive characteristics into the mentality and practice of Ukrainian political life for a long time but better forever.

I strongly insist on this development of logic and I strongly believe in this outcome of events and processes passing in this country.

Thank you for your attention!